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The history of adoption law and practice has received scant attention
from legal scholars and historians. 1 Most of what little scholarship there is
focuses on the history of adoption to the mid-nineteenth century, when the
first adoption statutes emerged in the United States.2 Although the enact-
ment of these statutes has been hailed as "an historic moment in the histo-
ry of Anglo-American family and society" 3 and "the most far-reaching
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1. This is surprising because adoption is one of our oldest and most significant family law
institutions. It dates back at least as far as the Code of Hammurabi, see Louis Quarles, The
Law of Adoption-A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV. 237, 240 (1949), and was practiced
by numerous ancient peoples, including the Egyptians, Greeks, Japanese, and Romans, id at
237-40. In the modem era, adoption is common. In the United States, for instance, approxi-
mately three percent of families have an adopted child, see Figuratively Speaking, 83 ABA
JOURNAL 16 (Jan. 1997) (citing ADOPTION FACTBOOK), and something on the order of one-
third of the American population is affected by one or more adoptive relationships. See
ADOPTION IN AMERICA, 1981: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGING, FAMILY AND
HUMAN SERVICES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 114, 119 (1981), cited in Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoptions, and
Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 712 n. 2 (1984).
2. See, e.g., C.M.A. McCauliff, The First English Adoption Law and its American
Precursors, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 656 (1986) (focusing on the history of the early
American statutes of the 1850s and the first English adoption statute enacted in 1826);
Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAMILY L. 677 (1981-82) (examin-
ing adoption practices in America prior to the passage of adoption statutes in the mid-nine-
teenth century); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law:
Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 N.w. L. REV. 1038 (1979) (analyz-
ing the emergence of American adoption statutes in light of changes in conceptions of the
family and child custody law); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAMILY L. 443 (1971) (examining the history of adoption
to the mid-nineteenth century, including the treatment of adoption-related issues by state
appellate courts in the 1870s and 1880s); Quarles, supra note 1 (providing a brief history of
adoption law with particular attention to the 1858 statute enacted in Wisconsin); Catherine
N. McFarlane, The Mississippi Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L.J. 239 (1938) (describing the
origin of Mississippi's adoption statute, the first such statute enacted in America).
3. Zainaldin, supra note 2, at 1085.
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innovation of nineteenth-century custody law," 4 few scholars have made
an effort to document the actual operation of adoption law following the
enactment of these landmark statutes. 5
This article does just that. Drawing from actual trial court records,
orphanage reports, appellate court decisions, and other sources, we
describe the law and practice of adoption in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries 6 in Alameda County, California, and argue that the
adoption statutes (at least the California statutes) made three distinct types
of adoption possible:
Family preservation adoption, which reflected a tie to past, informal
"adoption" practices, enabled adopters to keep already-established fami-
lies and family money together.
Family creation adoption, which emerged as the dominant type
of adoption in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, gave
childless couples a way to approximate the biological parent-child
relationship.
And family re-creation adoption, a precursor to the modal practice of
adoption in the mid-to-late twentieth century, enabled stepfathers to
remake families previously disrupted by divorce or death.
I. THE ADOPTION STUDY
A. Background
Adoption was unknown at common law.7 Although Massachusetts is
generally cited as the first American state to have enacted a comprehensive
4. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 268 (1985).
5. See Julie Berebitsky, "To Raise as Your Own": The Growth of Legal Adoption in
Washington, 6 WASH. HIST. 5, 6 (1994) (using the records of "two dominant child-care
agencies," not court records, to "reconstruct[] the experience of adopting a child in
Washington [D.C.]"); Peter Romanofsky, The Early History of Adoption Practices, 1870-
1930 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation). For studies of adoption during a later period,
see Elinor Nims, The Illinois Adoption Law and its Administration (1928), in DAVID J.
ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ADOPTION (1987) (examining the prac-
tice of adoption in Illinois, primarily in Cook County, during 1925); Ida R. Parker, 'Fit and
Proper'? A Study of Legal Adoption in Massachusetts (1927), in ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN
(examining the practice of adoption in Massachusetts, primarily in Suffolk and Norfolk
Counties, from 1922-25).
6. This period is commonly referred to as the "Progressive Era." See, e.g., MARY ANN
MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY
IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1994).
7. Presser, supra note 2, at 443. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, A Moving Target:
Class, Gender, and Family Law in the Nineteenth Century United States 13 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors). Of course, prior to the enactment of these statutes,
parties informally "adopted" children through wills, voluntary and involuntary indentures,
private legislative acts, and other means. See generally Kawashima, supra note 2, at 677;
Presser, supra note 2, at 456-64.
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public law of adoption, 8 at least four other states had enacted adoption
statutes prior to Massachusetts: Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, and
Vermont. 9 None, however, enacted a statute as far-reaching or compre-
hensive as the Massachusetts act. Within twenty-five years of its enact-
ment, twenty-four states had passed similar adoption statutes.10
These newly-enacted adoption statutes took one of two forms.II
Some, like the Texas and Missouri statutes, aimed simply to ratify and
record private adoption agreements, while others provided for judicial
supervision of the adoption process. California's adoption law, 12 enacted
on March 31, 1870, was of the second, more intrusive type.13 Under the
California law, an adult could adopt any minor at least 10 years younger
than that adult. 14 Depending upon the circumstances, several parties were
required to consent to the adoption before the judge could approve it. If
the adoptive parent was married, spousal consent was required.15 If the
adoptee was over the age of twelve, the adoptee's consent was required.16
The biological parents, if living, were usually required to consent; if the
child was born out of wedlock, however, the mother's consent alone
would suffice. 17
The petitioners, the child, and the others whose consent was required
appeared before the local superior court judge to sign the adoption
8. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 7, at 13 ("Credit for introducing adoption as a legal
status is often given to a statute passed in 1851 in Massachusetts."); Kawashima, supra note
2, at 677; McCauliff, supra note 2, at 666; Presser, supra note 2, at 465; Zainaldin, supra
note 2, at 1042.
9. Mississippi enacted the first American adoption statute in 1846. Miss. LAWS 1846, c.
60, MISS. CODE (Hutchinson 1848) ch. 35, art 2. For a comprehensive description of the
emergence of the Mississippi law, see McFarlane, supra note 2, at 239. By 1850, Alabama,
Texas, and Vermont also had adoption statutes on their books. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 211 (2d ed. 1985); Presser, supra note 2, at 465, n. 106.
10. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 677-78.
11. Presser, supra note 2, at 466.
12. "An Act providing for the adoption of minors, and the legitimizing of children born
out of wedlock." STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA, Ch. 385 (1870).
13. Presser, supra note 2, at 465-66. But see In re Johnson, 98 Cal. at 546 (J. Harrison,
dissenting) ("The provisions of the Civil Code of this state [California] differ materially
from those of any other state to which our attention has been called, and are characterized by
much greater simplicity."). 1,
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 221-22 (Hart 1892). The California statute in effect during the
period of our study was almost identical to the original statute. One difference, however, was
that under the original statute, only those children at least 15 years younger than a petition-
er-not those 10 years younger-were eligible for adoption by that petitioner. STATUTES OF
CALIFORNIA, Ch. 385 § 1 (1870).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 223 (Hart 1892).
16. CAL. Clv. CODE § 225 (Hart 1892).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (Hart 1892) (Consent required "except that consent is not nec-
essary from a father or mother deprived of civil rights, or adjudged guilty of adultery, or of
cruelty, and for either cause divorced, or adjudged to be a habitual drunkard, or who has
been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect.").
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agreement and consent forms. 18 The statute required the judge to conduct
a separate "examination" of each of these persons19 to determine whether
"the interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption." 20 Once the
judge issued the adoption order, the adoptive parent(s) and child sustained
"towards each other the legal relation of parent and child, and ha[d] all the
rights and [were] subject to all the duties of that relation." 21 Conversely,
the biological parents were "relieved of all parental duties towards, and all
responsibility for, the child so adopted, and [had] no right over it."22
B. Locus and Methodology
This article reports adoptions obtained in Alameda County,
California. During the period of our study-the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries-Alameda County, an urban and suburban county
located on the east side of San Francisco Bay, had already emerged as a
prominent, highly populated part of the northern California landscape.
Organized in 1853, shortly after California became a state, Alameda
County was home to several sizeable cities, including Oakland, Berkeley,
and Fremont. Throughout
the period of this study,
Alameda County's popu-
lation grew from 93,864
in 1890 to nearly a quarter
of a million residents in
1910.23 (See Figure 1.)
Prospective adoptive
parents filed for adoption
in Alameda County's civil
court, where their
petitions were recorded
in the Alameda County
Civil Court Register of






1880 1890 1900 1910
Residents
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226 (Hart 1892).
19. See In re Williams, 102 Cal. 70, 80-81 (1894) ("[T]he object of the statute in direct-
ing the judge to make a separate examination of the parties, was for the protection of a wife,
or child over the age of twelve years, whose consent is made essential to the creation of the
contract, by guarding them in some degree from the possible coercive influence of the hus-
band or parent, and also to enable the judge to ascertain whether the consent of such persons
was entirely free.").
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 227 (Hart 1892).
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 228 (Hart 1892).
22. CAL. CIv. CODE § 229 (Hart 1892). See also Younger v. Younger, 106 Cal 377, 379
(1895) ("By the adoption proceeding, however, the status of the child was wholly changed;
it became ipsofacto the child of another, and ceased to sustain that relation, in a legal sense,
to its natural parents.").
23. Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in
Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc. REV. 267, 273 (1976).
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Actions.24 Using this register, we identified the adoption petitions filed in
the county from 1890 to 1910. Having identified the adoption petitions
filed, we then located and analyzed the 125 adoption case files available
from 1895 to 1906.25 We also reviewed Bay Area orphanage reports,
California appellate court decisions, local newspapers, and other
secondary sources.
C. Results
During the period of our study, adop-
tion did not loom large on the civil docket.
From 1890 to 1910, prospective adoptive
parents filed an average of 13 petitions per
year, ranging from a low of three petitions
in 1894 to a high of 38 petitions in 1908.
(See Figure 2.) Adoption accounted for
only 1.1% of the total number of civil
cases filed in Alameda County during this
period. (See Table 1.)26







1890 1885 1900 1905 1910
Number Filed
TABLE I
ADOPTION ON THE CIVIL DOCKET
























24. Adoption records are difficult to obtain and are often shrouded in secrecy. We were
lucky to find actual trial court records from Alameda County. See Victor E. Flango, Are
Courts an Untapped Source of Adoption Statistics?, 11 ST. COURT J. 12, 13 (1987) ("Despite
the efforts of many talented people, even the most basic data, including data on the total
number of adoptions in the United States, are unavailable. There have been efforts to collect
this information, but they have their limitations."). See also Annette Ruth Appell, Blending
Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75
B.U. L. REV. 997, 997 (1995) ("The adoption paradigm that has dominated most of this cen-
tury is one of exclusivity, secrecy, and transposition, through which the adoptee-usually an
infant-is taken from one family and given to another, with all vestiges of the first family
removed. The records of this transplant are sealed, and all parties venture forth as if the first
family never existed and the second was created through an act of nature.").
25. We selected these years to study because Stanford Law School possesses the original
Alameda County civil records from this period. The Alameda County Civil Court Register
of Actions reports that 132 adoption petitions were filed from 1895 to 1906, but we were
able to locate only 125 case files.
26. To further assess adoption's place in the civil justice system during this period, we
took a random sample of civil cases filed in Alameda County Superior Court from 1895 to
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Family law actions as
a whole occupied a size-
able portion of the civil
court's time and caseload,
accounting for about a
quarter of the court's busi-
ness. From 1890 to 1910,
the average number of
family law actions filed per
year was 328, ranging from
141 in 1890 to 718 in
1910. (See Figure 3.) Over
the course of these two
decades, adoption account-
ed for about four percent of
the family law cases filed.
(See Table 2.) In some
years, of course, adoption
figured more prominently;
in 1908, for instance, adop-
tion accounted for nearly
six percent of the family
law cases filed. In other
years, however, adoption
was but a blip on the
screen; in 1894, for
instance, adoption account-
ed for only two percent of
the family law cases on the
docket. 27
Most family law
cases during this period,
90-95% of the total num-
ber of family law cases
filed, were divorce actions.
(See Table 2.) For every
adoption, approximately
20 disgruntled spouses









1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Number Filed
TABLE 2
ADOPTION, DIVORCE, AND OTHER FAMILY LAW
ACTIONS
YEAR ADOPTION DIVORCE OTHER TOTAL
PETITIONS PETITIONS FAMILY
1890 6 125 10 141
1891 8 167 3 178
1892 9 185 4 198
1893 6 164 5 175
1894 3 130 4 137
1895 7 169 7 183
1896 8 189 4 201
1897 9 180 5 194
1898 7 206 6 219
1899 8 201 12 221
1900 13 218 6 237
1901 9 283 18 310
1902 17 328 7 352
1903 14 299 6 319
1904 7 309 14 330
1905 11 354 12 377
1906 22 385 9 416
1907 29 570 23 622
1908 38 637 8 683
1909 26 651 17 694
1910 30 668 20 718
TOTAL 287 6,418 200 6905
1907 and catalogued them by type of action. Of the 2,634 actions we catalogued, fewer than
30 were adoption cases.
Our results, based on a sample of 20% of the cases, are comparable to the results obtained
by Friedman & Percival, who catalogued 14% of Alameda County cases filed during 1890
and three percent of the cases filed during 1910. Friedman & Percival, supra note 23, at 281.
27. Adoption was also less common than other significant personal and family landmarks,
such as births, marriages, and deaths. In 1900, for example, there were 13 adoption petitions
filed in Alameda County; by comparison, there were at least 1,336 marriages. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
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showed up to file divorce papers. 28 About half of the divorce cases during
this era involved spouses with children; roughly 70% of these resulted in
some sort of custody disposition, generally affecting about two children
per custody order.29 Thus, for every adoption during this period, courts and
parents "divided" 20 children as part of divorce cases. 30 These divorces
and their custody dispositions obviously affected the lives of many more
Alameda County children than did the occasional adoption.3 1
Although adoption did not occupy a significant portion of the civil
docket, it was undoubtedly a significant event for the parties involved,
namely the adopters and adoptees. The adopters in our study consisted of
98 couples and 27 single adults, most of whom were either stepfathers or
widows. The average adoptive mother was approximately 41 years old,
while the average adoptive father was about 43. The vast majority of these
adoptive parents employed legal counsel to secure their adoptions, but as
many as 10-15% of them appeared
pro se. Figure 4 -Age of Adoptees
These petitioners adopted 137
children, most of whom were girls.
More than half of the children adopted
were age five or younger, while fewer
than four percent were over age 15.
(See Figure 4.) The average adopted
girl was five years old at the time of
her adoption, while the average boy
was almost seven. Many of the
adoptees were born in wedlock, but a
substantial minority was not. The chil- * 11-15 Ov 15 o is
dren were available for adoption for a
1867-1906, PART II 790, 790 n.2 (1908). And in Oakland alone, which accounted for only
slightly over half of the county's population, there were 1,255 births and 1,121 deaths
reported in 1900. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VITAL STATISTICS, PART 1296 (1902).
28. We have established a database containing detailed information on a random sample
of 583 divorce cases heard in the Alameda County Superior Court during approximately the
same time period, 1895-1907. Data on file with the authors.
29. In our sample of divorce cases from 1895-1907, we collected data on 583 divorces, of
which 292 involved children. Divorce was granted in 220 of the 292 cases. The records con-
tained custody dispositions in 203 of these cases. Data on file with the authors.
30. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992).
31. The courts also provided for the creation of substitute parent-child-type relationships
via guardianship, a probate proceeding in which courts appoint a guardian to care for minors
and their property. In 1890, 1895, 1900, and 1905, petitioners applied for guardianship of
one or more minors in 336 cases. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Joanna L. Grossman & Chris
Guthrie, Guardians: A Research Note, 40 AMER. J. LEG. HIST. 146, 149 (1996). During those
same four years, petitioners filed for adoption in 37 cases. For every adoption petition filed
in 1890, 12 petitioners filed for guardianship; for every adoption petitioner in 1905, nearly
six petitioners sought guardianship. On average, guardianship of minors outpaced adoption
by almost a ten-to-one ratio during this period.
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variety of reasons, but three loomed Figure 5 -Adoption "Causes"
largest. Death of natural parents was
the underlying "cause" of adoption in 
___
more than 45% of the cases, parental
abandonment in nearly 40% of the
cases, and divorce in more than 10%
of the cases. (See Figure 5.)32
The adoption petitioners were
quite successful in adopting the chil-
dren they sought. In fact, every
Alameda County petitioner from L] Death [l Abandonment
1895 to 1906 secured adoption papers 0 Divorce U Other
from the court, and most did so the
same day they filed their petition. Figure 6 - Case Duration
Roughly three-fourths of the 125
adoption cases in our study were
resolved the same day they were
filed, and more than 90% were
resolved within one week of the date
filed. Only 6.4% of all adoption
actions took longer than two weeks to
resolve. (See Figure 6.)33 By contrast,
the average Alameda County divorce
case during this era took more than same Day L I Week
thirteen months to resolve, 34 divorce 2 aeka > 2 Weeks
cases involving children took nearly
fifteen months to resolve,35 annulments took nearly four months,36 and
guardianships took nearly three weeks. 37
Because the court processed adoption cases almost as soon as they
appeared, and because the court approved every adoption petition filed, it
seems clear that the court subjected adopters and the petitioners they filed
to minimal scrutiny. On occasion this haste led to harmful results. In one
case, Mary Larmer petitioned to adopt her two grandchildren, Charles and
32. In a number of cases-13 of the 125 in our study-we could not identify why the
adoptee was available for adoption.
33. The few adoptions that took more than three weeks to resolve required extra time
because the court had some difficulty locating parties whose consent was required. In one
extreme example of this, Albert Keesing and Florence Benini abandoned their nine-year-old
daughter Florence. Albert went off to New York to live, while Florence left the country for
Italy. Albert's mother, Florence's paternal grandmother, petitioned to adopt Florence on
December 9, 1898. The court approved her petition but not until March 31, 1899. The delay
was caused by the difficulty the court encountered locating Florence's parents. Docket #15763.
34. Data on file with the authors.
35. Data on file with the authors.
36. Joanna L. Grossman & Chris Guthrie, The Road Less Taken: Annulment at the Turn
of the Century, 40 AMER. J. LEG. HIST. 307 (1996).
37. Friedman, Grossman & Guthrie, supra note 31, at 152.
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Edward.38 In court, Mary claimed that the boys had been abandoned by
their parents, who were nowhere to be found. The court accepted her story
without question and granted her petition the day it was filed.
Subsequently, Edward and Sarah Schiller, the parents of the boys, sought
an order setting aside the adoption because it had been fraudulently
obtained. It turns out that Mary had invited the boys to stay with her tem-
porarily. During that stay, Mary had concocted the abandonment story,
secured the boys' adoption, taken the boys out of the state, and refused to
return them to their parents.
In another case, Robert and Mattie Vincent petitioned to adopt Ruth
Garcewich. Ruth lived with her "aunt," Winefred Herbert, who represent-
ed to the judge that Ruth's mother had died and that her father had aban-
doned her. Winefred consented to the adoption petition filed by the
Vincents, and the court granted the adoption. Five years later, the
Vincents petitioned the court to annul the adoption on the ground that
Winefred, Ruth's "aunt," had misled them about her identity. It turns out
that Winefred was not Ruth's aunt but her natural mother! Despite the
examinations it had supposedly conducted at the hearing, the court failed
to uncover the identity and relationship of the parties involved. In their
petition to annul the adoption, the Vincents charged:
.. . [T]he true facts are now known to be as follows: That the so-called Ruth
Garcewich is not the child of the deceased sister of said Winefred Herbert but is a
child of said Winefred Herbert ... That the said Winefred Herbert has, within the
last year, sought the society of said child and obtained it by meeting the said
child on the streets and at school ... and has explained to said child that she is
the mother of said child .... 39
Apparently Winefred's behavior caused Ruth to become "hateful, ugly
and disobedient," making it "impossible to carry out the purpose and
objects of said adoption." 40 The court was persuaded, annulling the adop-
tion on September 4, 1908.
These cases were no doubt exceptional. In a majority of the cases,
petitioners who used the adoption proceeding formed "substitute" parent-
child relationships that were likely beneficial to children and parents
alike. The following section describes the three types of substitute parent-
child relationships the adoption statutes made possible.
II. THE THREE TYPES OF ADOPTION
The adoption statutes authorized a single process called "adoption"
but effectively produced three distinct types of parent-child relationships.
In this section-based on a subset of 86 cases 4 1-we describe and
38. Docket #24166.
39. Docket #19570, Petition to Annul.
40. Id.
41. Because information was too sketchy in the remaining files in our sample to draw any
conclusions about the adopters, adoptees, "causes" of adoption, purposes for which it was
sought, etc., we excluded those files from the analysis in this section.
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compare the three types of adoption in operation at the turn of the century:
family preservation, family creation, and family re-creation adoption.
A. Family Preservation
Adoption often functioned to preserve families and family money. In
family preservation adoptions-22. 1% of the adoptions in our study-an
older adult or couple sought to adopt a young relative or relatives to pre-
serve family ties, family heritage, and family wealth. (See Figure 7.)
Before the adoption statutes were enacted, adults informally "adopt-
ed" children related to them by blood or marriage to keep families and fam-
ily money together.42 In colonial America, long before the first adoption
statutes were enacted, the "putting out" of children "was the way the
colonists cared for orphans." 43 According to Kawashima, "[p]arents ordi-
narily provided for the disposition of the child in their wills and usually had
him reared by a relative, elder stepbrother, grandparent, stepparent, elder
brother, elder sister, aunt, or uncle." 44 Even where no will gave explicit
child care directions, however, "there was apparently a similar pattern of
placing orphans in the homes of relatives." 45
After the adoption statutes were passed, formal adoptions of this
type began to occur as well. The typical family preservation adoption
involved an older adult, often a grandparent, filing a petition to adopt an
older, legitimate child or children, who had recently been orphaned.
Often, the adoption papers made specific reference to family preservation,
to a deceased family member's will, or to inheritance in describing the
adopter's motives.
Grace Nosier, for example,
adopted her sister's son Harold to
keep the family together. 46  Figure 7 - Three Adoption Functions
Harold's father had died before
Harold had reached his seventh_
birthday. Following his father's
death, Harold and his mother
moved in with Harold's aunt and
uncle, Grace and Thomas Nosier.
Harold's mother eventually took
ill. While on her deathbed, she
asked her sister and brother-in- Preservation E creation
law to adopt Harold and keep the Re creation
family together. Two months
42. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 689 ("The majority of colonial adoptions involved chil-
dren of relatives, such as nephews, nieces, grandchildren, and wife's nephews and nieces..
43. Id. at 683.
44. Id.
45. Presser, supra note 2, at 457.
46. Docket #17840.
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after she died, Grace and Thomas Nosler petitioned the court to adopt
Harold, then 11 years old. The court granted their petition. 47
In a similar case, Norman Wiley lost his mother when he was eight
years old and his father when he was 10. In his will, Norman's father had
nominated Norman's grandfather to be Norman's guardian. One month
after Norman's father died, his grandfather and grandmother petitioned to
adopt Norman to preserve the family and prevent him from depleting his
$5,000 inheritance.4 8
In these family preservation adoptions-roughly one-fifth to one-
quarter of those processed in the courts during this period-an older adult
or couple sought to keep a family together by adopting a nephew, grand-
child, or some other child relative.
B. Family Creation
Family preservation adoption 49 gave way in importance over the
course of the nineteenth century to a second type of adoption-family cre-
ation adoption-which become the modal type of adoption in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In family creation adoptions-
approximately two-thirds of those obtained during the progressive era 50 -
a younger couple sought to create a brand new family, or add to an exist-
ing one, by adopting a child, generally a "dependent" child,51 to whom
the couple was unrelated.
During the period of our study, California was home to proportionally
more dependent children than any other state. 52 Commentators attributed
the high rate of child dependency to a variety of factors, including alcohol
consumption, "Bohemianism," the high proportion of immigrants in the
state, illegitimacy, and even the mild California climate. 53 To address this
social problem, the so-called "child-savers" 54-charitable workers and
47. Id.
48. Docket #24376.
49. See Section II. A., supra.
50. See Figure 7, supra.
51. According to Susan Tiffin, an 1899 Illinois statute provided a fairly typical definition
of a "dependent" child:
[T]he words dependent child and neglected child shall mean any child who for any reason
is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or has not proper care or guardianship; or who
habitually begs or receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill-fame or with
any vicious or disreputable person, or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or deprav-
ity on the part of its parents, guardians or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit
place for such a child; any child under the age of eight who is found peddling or selling
any article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the street or giving any
public entertainment.
SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
38-39 (1982).
52. WILLIAM H. SLINGERLAND, CHILD WELFARE WORK IN CALIFORNIA 17 (1916).
53. Id. at 193-97.
54. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 113-45 (1986).
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philanthropists-set up institutions designed to meet the needs of depen-
dent children. 55 In 1850, child-savers started a Jewish home, 56 then the San
Francisco Protestant Orphan Asylum in 1851, and the Roman Catholic
Orphan Asylum in 1852.57 Soon, orphanages "began to flourish and multi-
ply faster in California than in any other state of comparable population,
and continued to do so until they reached their peak in 1903."58
Some of the orphanages and other child-saving institutions provided
adequate care to the children they housed, 59 but many did not. 6 0
According to California child-saver Katharine Felton, conditions in Bay
Area institutions during the 1890s were intolerable:
In San Francisco, before the fire, conditions in many institutions were as terrible
as anything to be found in the old English poorhouses. There was no state law to
prevent anyone from going into children's work. Mercenary, sometimes criminal
persons took it up as a profession. One cannot imagine a state of things that could
be worse .... 61
Orphanages were apt to be cold and gloomy structures remarkably ill-suited to
their purpose, and with inadequate and untrained staffs. Hygiene and health care
were primitive; the meals were badly cooked, monotonous, and ninety per cent
starch. Above all, orphanages were overcrowded. 62
55. Walter Trattner notes that the child welfare movement emerged not solely due to
concern for dependent children but also due to desire for social control:
A growing concern with child welfare, however, was not merely a matter of pity or com-
passion. Indeed, it resulted above all from the fact that most citizens viewed the child as
the key to social control. If future generations were to possess the strength of mind, body,
and character to become good, self-supporting citizens, able to assume the responsibilities
and burdens of democratic rule, they had to be protected as children. Youngsters, in other
words, were the hope--or the threat--of the future.
WALTER 1. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE
IN AMERICA 11 I (5th ed. 1994).
56. For a history of Jewish orphanages in the United States, see REENA SIGMAN
FRIEDMAN, THESE ARE OUR CHILDREN: JEWISH ORPHANAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-
1925 (1994).
57. Joan Gittens describes the same phenomenon occurring at the same time in Cook
County, Illinois. See JOAN GITTENS, POOR RELATIONS: THE CHILDREN OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, 1818-1990 27 (1994).
58. JEAN BURTON, KATHARINE FELTON AND HER SOCIAL WORK IN SAN FRANCISCO 43
(1947).
59. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 58, at 44 ("Children's institutions were practically all
denominational homes, modeled on accepted Nineteenth Century patterns. In some, the chil-
dren were given humane and kindly care.").
60. See, e.g., TRATrNER, supra note 55, at 116 ("Although these separate institutions were
on the whole superior to the almshouses as places for child care and conditions among them
varied, they too had many defects. Most were large, congregate institutions which brought
together under a single roof anywhere from fifty to as many as 2000 children. Managers of
such institutions put a premium on order, obedience, and precision. The poor wards com-
monly slept and ate together in large dormitories or barracks. Their lives were governed by
extremely rigid schedules, individuality was suppressed, and the atmosphere was one of
monotonous routine ...The often provided poor and protracted care."). See generally
TIFFIN, supra note 5 I, at 67-76.
61. Id. at46.
62. Id. at 47. See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO NURSERY FOR HOMELESS
CHILDREN (1893). The San Francisco Nursery for Homeless Children reported that of the 91
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Among the child-saving institutions, conditions in the foundling hos-
pitals were particularly poor.63 These institutions-like the San Francisco
Lying-In Hospital, where three of the children in our study were
abandoned-housed dependent infants, often children born out of
wedlock and then deserted by their mothers. The mortality rate in these
institutions was generally around 50 to 75%,64 and "sometimes reached
between 85 to 90 percent."65
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the child-
savers' view of child care underwent a transformation, reflecting concern
about the quality of institutional care children were receiving. 66
children admitted in 1892, eight died, while only five were adopted. Annual Report of the
Secretary, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO NURSERY FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN 7
(1893). Despite the fact that nearly 10% of its charges died during the year, the Nursery
celebrated this turn of events:
Upon comparing this report with the one for the previous year, it is a noticeable fact that
the death-rate has decreased materially during the past year, the number of deaths in 1891
being 29. This shows most conclusively that the course of medical treatment adopted by
the Board of Managers at the beginning of the year, has been thoroughly satisfactory.
Id.
63. See GEORGE B. MANGOLD, PROBLEMS OF CHILD WELFARE 537-38 (1925) ("The
mortality rate in these institutions [foundling asylums] is frequently enormous. Many of the
children, it is true, are received in a precarious condition, and suffer from malnutrition,
premature birth, physical defects, or inanition, while illegitimacy is usually a factor. Despite
these obstacles, the proper care of the babies can substantially reduce the death rate. Usually
these asylums accept too many children and overcrowd the various wards. Frequently the
inmates are not property fed and seldom do they receive sufficient individual attention.").
64. BURTON, supra note 58, at 90 ("The local mortality rate [in the San Francisco Bay
Area] among foundlings has soared to 59% after the fire [of 1906]; in some parts of
California it normally averaged between 50% and 75%.").
65. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF
CHILDREN 174 (1986). Due to a foundling asylum fire that killed twenty-five infants, includ-
ing one that she had placed there herself, Katharine Felton began a program of boarding
infants out in foster homes rather than keeping them in these institutions. In 1908, the San
Francisco Foundling Asylum placed all of its infants in Felton's agency, the Children's
Agency, to be boarded out. In its first year of operation, the death rate of abandoned infants
dropped from 59% (in the foundling asylum) to 12.8% (when infants were placed out in
homes by the Children's Agency). BURTON, supra note 58, at 88-92. For background on the
history of infant mortality in America, see RICHARD A. MECKEL, SAVE THE BABIES: AMERICAN
PUBLIC HEALTH REFORM AND THE PREVENTION OF INFANT MORTALITY 1850-1929 (1990).
66. FRANCES CAHN & VALESKA BARY, WELFARE ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1934 18 (1936) (referring to a "drift from institu-
tional care to home care."). See also KATZ, supra note 54, at 118 ("Institutions offended pro-
moters of the priceless child. They shuddered at the fate of the precious children denied a
home and worried about the impact of early incarceration on their adult personalities. Most
critics of institutions made the same points: the regimented monotony of institutional life
dulled children's personalities and destroyed their capacity for independence; institutional-
ized children, unable to make a gradual transition from dependence to independence, were
hurled abruptly and without preparation into the world; once on their own, ex-inmates knew
nothing of money or worldly skills acquired by most children in families; they lacked a net-
work of local friends and acquaintances to help launch them on careers; and, to many com-
mentators, most sadly, their emotional development had been stunted by a lack of affection
in childhood."); GITTENS, supra note 57, at 33 ("The notion of placing children in families
and the belief that normal family life was a far healthier situation than institutions was firmly
entrenched in child welfare thinking by the end of the century.").
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Progressive child-savers came to believe that home placements-whether
in adoptive homes, foster homes, or work homes-were better for chil-
dren than retention in children's institutions. 67 Accordingly, child-savers
began to found child-placing and home-finding agencies, including the
Children's Home Society, the Children's Home Finding Society, and the
Boys and Girls Aid Society of San Francisco, which provided for four
kinds of child placements, including legal adoption. Children could be
placed:
(a) [ulntil sixteen years of age, with board, clothes, and regular schooling;
(b) until eighteen, with above conditions plus $100, payable in four equal
installments-school attendance may cease at sixteen;
(c) by adoption, all legal expenses to be home by applicant; [or]
(d) on ordinary service at regular wages.68
The Boys and Girls Aid Society required applicants for a child (whether
interested in adoption or another form of home placement) to respond in
writing to 15 questions or requests for information, including the following:
State age of boy or girl [that you want to adopt or place];
What work do you wish him or her to do?;
Will it be convenient for you to send a child to church or Sunday-school every
Sunday or once a month?;
Do you want the boy or girl to eat with the family, or with servants or employees?;
Would you prefer an easy-going, though somewhat dull child, or one who is
intelligent, full of animal life, and more difficult to control?; [and]
Are you willing to exercise a great degree of patience and undergo some
annoyance, especially at the first, and give some personal attention to the training
of the boy or girl69
The application closed with two requests and a promise to provide an
appropriate child as soon as possible:
Will you kindly answer all these questions as frankly and as fully as you can, so
that we may form a fair idea of you and of the sort of child we should select for
you? Please inclose [sic] with your answer money to pay the fare. We will send,
upon receipt of your reply to these questions, the best we can, if we have one at
all suitable in our Home; if not, we will send one as soon thereafter as possible70
Despite the child-savers' emerging preference for home placements,
records from the period suggest that relatively few dependent children
found adoptive homes. In fact, many more children remained in institu-
tions than were placed in any kind of family home. In fiscal year 1904,
7,282 dependent children in California received state aid;T1 4,875 of them
67. Id.
68. THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOYS AND GIRLS AID SOCIETY 34 (1906).
69. Id. (emphasis in original)
70. Id.
71. In 1855, California began funneling state aid for dependent children through institu-
tions. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA, Ch. 148, § 1 (1855). A California Supreme Court decision
in 1888 held that state grants could be made not only to the orphanages themselves but also
to the counties for distribution to dependent children not in orphanages. Yolo v. Dunn, 77
Cal. 133 (1888).
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(66.9%) lived in orphanages rather than private homes.7 2 The following
year, the number of dependent children receiving aid increased (to 7,301),
as did the percentage residing in institutions (to 72.4%).73
Local orphanage reports confirm these statewide statistics. In 1893,
for instance, the Maria Kip Orphanage 74 cared for 91 children. Seventy-
three remained in the orphanage at the end of the year.75 In 1900, the
Ladies Protection and Relief Society 76 cared for 390 children. Of these
children, l1 were placed in homes, two were placed in other institutions,
and 216 remained in the Relief Society home. 77 In 1904, two institutions
that housed children later adopted by Alameda County residents-the
Beulah Orphanage 78 and West Oakland Home79-saw the number of resi-
dents in their homes remain constant throughout the year.80
A majority of the children adopted by the family creators in our
study spent at least part of their lives under the care of one or more of
these child-saving institutions. Some were abandoned at foundling hospi-
tals or asylums; others landed in orphanages; still others found their way
to child-placing agencies. A dozen of the children in our study were
housed at the West Oakland Home alone.8 1 One infant, known only as
72. CAHN & BARY, supra note 66, at 18.
73. Id. at 13. Gittens reported similar difficulties in the Chicago area shortly after the turn
of the century. See GITrENS, supra note 57, at 40 ("One of the concerns voiced frequently in
regard to the care of dependent children was that despite the general consensus that a family
setting was the best situation for children; in fact many children were still being placed in
institutions rather than being helped in their own homes or placed in foster families.").
74. "That the purposes for which it is formed are to take under its care and charge
orphans, half-orphans, destitute and friendless children, and provide them with a home, sus-
tenance and education during the period of their dependence..." Articles of Incorporation,
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARIA Kip ORPHANAGE 13 (1894).
75. Annual Report of the Secretary, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARIA KIP
ORPHANAGE 3 (1894).
76. "The object of this Society shall be to render protection and assistance to strangers,
and to dependent and destitute women and children." By-Laws of the San Francisco Ladies
Protection and Relief Society, FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGERS OF THE
SAN FRANCISCO LADIES PROTECTION AND RELIEF SOCIETY (1901).
77. FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGERS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO LADIES
PROTECTION AND RELIEF SOCIETY 7-8 (1901). The other 161 children were returned to their
homes.
78. A "Private corporation" for the "[care of orphan, half orphan, and abandoned chil-
dren" was founded in 1895. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, BENEVOLENT INSTITUTIONS 1904 56 (1905).
79. "West Oakland Home was founded in 1887 with the object of aiding and sheltering
abandoned and neglected children, orphans, and half-orphans, and children whose parents
were found unworthy or unfit to be their custodians." MAX AX. CLARK, SOCIAL SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONS OF OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 58 (1939).
80. On January I, 1904, the Beulah Orphanage had 64 residents; by the end of the year,
the number had increased to 69 (nearly an eight percent increase). The West Oakland Home
began the year with 108 residents and saw its number fall to 99 by the end of the year
(slightly more than an eight percent decrease). DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & LABOR, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BENEVOLENT INSTTUTIONS 1904 56 (1905).
81. See note 79, supra.
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"Mary," was left by her mother with a nurse, who turned her over to the
West Oakland Home. Before Mary turned two years old, the home was
able to find a couple to adopt her in 1895.82 Another infant named Mary
was also a short-term resident of the West Oakland Home. Prior to this
Mary's first birthday, John and Lillie Mason petitioned to adopt her, after
the home allowed them to "adopt" her on a trial basis for a three-month
period. The Masons' lawyer wrote that "your petitioners have no child of
their own, are amply able and willing to provide a good home for one and
being satisfied with this one, after a trial of three months, desire to adopt
and cloth [sic] it with all the relations of parent and child and treat it in all
respects as their own natural offspring." 83 The court granted their petition.
Other children in our study were left not in institutions but with
friends, acquaintances, and strangers. The local newspapers were littered
with articles about children abandoned in this manner. One article appear-
ing in the November 9, 1904 issue of the San Francisco Chronicle report-
ed that, "A tiny baby girl, about one month old, well-clothed and securely
wrapped in a basket, was left by unknown hands on the doorsteps of J.
Reed ... A note pinned to the clothes of the infant stated that the child
was of good parents, but that they were too poor to give it a respectable
bringing up."84 A similar article appearing in the July 7, 1908 issue of the
Chronicle reported that, while "strolling along the shore of Lake Merritt a
German visitor to Oakland, who was enjoying an after-dinner stroll, stum-
bled against a newspaper bundle and received the surprise of his life.
Staring at him from the folds of the printed pages were the large eyes of a
pretty four-weeks-old baby girl." 85 Still other children were left depen-
dent because of paternal death, divorce, and neglect.
Whether temporarily housed in a child-saving institution, left on a
park bench, or rendered dependent for some other reason, these children,
if ever legally adopted, were likely to be adopted by "family creators"-
married couples, unrelated to them by blood, who sought to adopt because
of their desire to create a family.
C. Family Re-Creation
While the modal adoption during the period of our study fell into the
family creation category, 86 stepfather adoptions began to occur with
increasing regularity due to rising divorce rates and remarriage.
Foretelling a future in which half of all adoptions from 1951 to 1981
would be stepparent adoptions, 87 family re-creation adoptions constituted
82. Docket #11871.50.
83. Docket #18790, Petition.
84. Baby GirlAbandoned by Unknown Parents, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 1904, at 16.
85. Finds Girl Baby on Shore of Lake, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 1908, at 5.
86. See Section II. B., supra.
87. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 852 (2d
ed. 1988). See also Martha Farnsworth Riche, The Adoption Story, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS
42 (March 1986) ("the rise in related adoptions may be due to the increase in the number of
remarriages in which the stepparent legally adopts the child of the new spouse.").
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nearly 12% of the adoptions in our study.88 In these family re-creation
adoptions, a stepfather sought to adopt the children who had arrived in his
home as a consequence of their mother's remarriage. 89
The emergence of these family re-creation adoptions coincided with
changes in both divorce and child custody. The late nineteenth century was
a time when marital turmoil translated into marital dissolution at a much
higher rate than it had in
the past. A federal study of Figure 8 - U.S. Divorces Granted
marriage and divorce 350,000-.
found that courts granted 300,000 -
53,574 divorces from 1867 25,000--
to 1871, 157,324 divbrces
from 1887 to 1891, and 200,000 -
332,262 divorces from 150,000
1902 to 1906. (See Figure 1 00,000
8.)90 That the divorce rate
was increasing rapidly at
the turn of the century was 0 ,--
no less true in Alameda 1867-71 1887-91 1902-6
County, the site of our [_ NumberGranted
adoption study. The num-
ber of divorce petitions Figure 9 - Alameda County Divorce Petitions
filed in the county jumped 700
from 125 in 1890 to 688 in
1910. (See Figure 9.) 800
Roughly half of these 500




With this increase in the 200-
number of divorces-many 10o
of which involved parents o-
with children-remar- 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
riage 92  and family
88. See Figure 9, supra.
89. Of course, when widows with children remarried, stepfather-stepchildren relation-
ships arose in the early American period as well, though stepfathers generally did not
"adopt" their stepchildren. Indeed, "the stepfather stood in an uncertain legal position with
regard to his stepchild." MASON, supra note 6, at 21.
90. JAMES P. LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CAUSATION 11 (1909)
(quoting CARROLL D. WRIGHT, A REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES
1867-86 and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A SPECIAL REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE,
1867-1906).
91. See note 29, supra.
92. The right of remarriage was not, however, unrestricted. In 1897, the California legis-
lature modified the divorce laws to disallow remarriage within one year of divorce and thus
to "correct a great public evil which had become too rife-to put a stop to marriages within
the period allowed for an appeal from the decree of divorce, which might be and sometimes
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re-creation adoption became more common. 93
The emergence of family re-creation adoption coincided not only
with the rapid increase in the rate of divorce but also with the enhance-
ment of women's custody rights. While divorce was quite rare historical-
ly, even rarer was the woman, whether divorced or widowed, who had
legal custody or guardianship over her children to share with a new hus-
band. At common law, husbands had the right to full custody and control
of their children, while wives were "entitled to no power, but only to rev-
erence and respect." 94 Consequently, a mother who had entered into a
second marriage would not have been able to employ the legal construct
of adoption even if it had been available.
During the progressive era, however, the father's apparent absolute
right to custody gave way to emerging maternal custody rights. 95
This decrease in paternal custody rights and comcomitant increase in
had been reversed, with great scandal to the parties who had married again." See GEORGE
ELLIOTT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 150 (1904) (quoting Judge
Belher in Abbie Rose Wood v. Estate of Joseph M. Wood, filed in the Superior Court of San
Francisco, June 14, 1900).
93. Additionally, family re-creation adoption was made more likely by a feature of the
California family code during this period. Adoption petitioners normally had to obtain the
consent of both of the adoptee's natural parents to obtain an adoption, see CAL. CIV. CODE §
224 (Hart 1892), but the statute waived this requirement if the adoptee's parents had
divorced on the basis of certain grounds, including "cruelty" or "adultery." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 224 provided that "a legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents,
if living ... except that consent is not necessary from a father or mother deprived of civil
rights or adjudged guilty of adultery or of cruelty, and for either cause divorced." See also
MASON, supra note 6, at 74-75.
Apparently the courts enforced this waiver, as Edward Younger discovered the hard way.
After Edward's wife divorced him on grounds of cruelty and obtained custody of their child,
she petitioned to allow her father to adopt their child. Edward petitioned to modify the
court's earlier custody award in light of the fact that his ex-wife no longer wanted custody of
the child. The court, however, citing the statutory provision waiving consent of the parent
"guilty" of cruelty in divorce, concluded that it could not entertain Edward's claim because
"[b]y the adoption proceeding ... the status of the child was wholly changed; it became ipso
facto the child of another, and ceased to sustain that relation, in a legal sense, to its natural
parents." Younger, 106 Cal. at 379.
More than 40% of Alameda County spouses who petitioned for divorce during the period
of our study did so on the basis of cruelty or adultery. Data on file with the authors. See also
ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN
AMERICA 175 (1980) (finding that 35% of 1880s Los Angeles divorce petitioners asserted
"extreme cruelty" and nine percent "adultery" as the "primary legal ground" upon which
their divorce petition was based). See generally ROBERT C. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE
IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890 (1982).
94. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
452 452 (George Sharwood ed., 1860); GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 234-37.
95. As Michael Grossberg explains, the combination of many anti-patriarchal forces con-
verged in this era to shift away from unmitigated paternal custody rights to a standard more
focused on the best interests of children. GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 236-37. This shift was
effected, Grossberg explains, using three innovations: "the use of child nurture to circum-
scribe paternal custody rights and expand maternal ones; the reliance on the interests of the
children to increase the legal rights of surrogate parents; and the creation through the inven-
tion of adoption of an artificial family based on volunteerism, not blood." Id.
Vol. XLIII
ADOPTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
maternal custody rights reflected the successes of early advocates for
equal custody rights96 as well as the emergence of a new ethic regarding
the significance of the maternal role.97
These societal changes in divorce and maternal custody rights
combined to produce, during the period of our study, the initial
trickle98 of what would eventually become a flood of family re-creation
adoptions. For these stepfather petitioners and their new brides, adoption
served to re-create families previously disrupted by death or divorce.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the adoption statutes was "an historic moment"99
and a "far-reaching innovation"100 because the statutes expanded the legal
definition of family to include parent-child relationships based on contract.
By giving parties the freedom to contract for children, the adoption statutes
made a variety of parent-child relationships legally possible. Not surpris-
ingly, our examination of the Alameda County court records reveals that
parties used these statutes to form distinct types of parent-child relation-
ships, each of which reflected the differing needs of the adopters, the nat-
ural parents, and perhaps even the adoptees. By allowing a grandmother to
adopt her orphaned grandchild, the adoption statutes made family preser-
vation possible. By allowing a childless couple to adopt an abandoned
infant, the adoption statutes made family creation possible. And by allow-
ing a stepfather to adopt his new bride's older child, the adoption statutes
made family re-creation possible. Whether family preservation, creation,
or re-creation, the innovation of the adoption statutes was to make parent-
child relationships possible where blood could not.
96. As early as the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848, the burgeoning women's rights
movement publicly demanded equal custody and guardianship rights for women. As part of
the "history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman," the con-
vention's Declaration of Sentiments included the following: "He has so framed the laws of
divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and in case of separation, to whom the
guardianship of the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of
women-the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and
giving all power into his hands." 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 71-72 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds. 1881). In reparation for this, the
Declaration demanded that women "have immediate admission to all the rights and privi-
leges which belong to them as citizens of the United States." Id.
97. This new ethic of placing "emphasis ... on the role of the mother in raising children"
in the nineteenth century is often referred to as the "cult of motherhood." Mason, supra note
6, at 51.
98. See, e.g., Docket #19100 (reporting that Lydia Perkins divorced Frank Perkins and
then married William Fogg, who proceeded to adopt her 12-year-old son, Harold); Docket
#19528 (reporting that E.A. Chappell petitioned to adopt his new wife's 10-year-old daugh-
ter from her previous marriage).
99. See note 3, supra.
100. See note 4, supra.
1999
